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Abstract—Secret key generation (SKG) schemes have been
shown to be vulnerable to denial of service (DoS) attacks in
the form of jamming. In this paper, a comprehensive study on
the impact of correlated and uncorrelated jamming in wireless
SKG systems is presented. First, optimal signalling schemes
for the legitimate users and jamming approaches for an active
adversary launching a DoS attack on the SKG system are derived.
It is shown that the legitimate users should employ constant
signalling. On the other hand, the jammer should inject either
correlated jamming when imperfect channel state information
(CSI) regarding the main channel is at their disposal, or,
uncorrelated jamming when the main channel CSI is completely
unknown. In both cases, optimal power allocation policies are
studied under short-term power constrains for M block fading
additive white Gaussian noise (BF-AWGN) channels. Numerical
evaluations demonstrate that equidistribution of the jamming
power is near-optimal in the case of uncorrelated jamming.
Index Terms—Jamming, communication system security, phys-
ical layer security.
I. INTRODUCTION
The increasing deployment of wireless networks poses secu-
rity challenges in next generation dynamic and decentralized
networks, consisting of low-cost, low-complexity devices.
Over the last two decades alternative/complementary means
to secure data exchange in wireless settings have been in-
vestigated in the framework of physical layer security (PLS),
addressing jointly the issues of reliability and secrecy. One
of the most mature topics in PLS is the generation of secret
keys via public discussion, based on either the so-called source
model [1]–[5] or the so-called channel model [6].
Recently, in [7] the effect of denial of service attacks (DoS)
in the form of jamming was demonstrated to substantially
decrease SKG rates; with increasing jamming power the SKG
rates were shown to asymptotically diminish. In this investiga-
tion the adversaries were assumed to inject constant jamming
signals and have been shown to have a maximum impact on
the SKG system when they were able to evaluate the channel
state information (CSI) in the links between themselves and
the legitimate nodes (partial CSI availability). However, the
optimality of injecting constant jamming signals was not stud-
ied, neither was the scenario in which the adversary obtains
an imperfect estimate of the main channel CSI. Furthermore,
this analysis concerned exclusively narrowband SKG systems
while typical anti-jamming techniques such as direct sequence
spread spectrum, spread spectrum frequency hopping and un-
coordinated hopping/spreading approaches span many parallel
subchannels.
As a result, a systematic analysis of the impact of jamming
in SKG systems with parallel subchannels when imperfect CSI
might be available at the adversarial node is timely. We begin
our investigation by determining optimal signalling schemes
for the pair of legitimate nodes and the jammer. It is shown
that the legitimate nodes should employ a constant signalling
scheme, while the jammer – depending on the availability
of side information in the form of imperfect main channel
CSI – should either inject correlated or uncorrelated jamming.
Next, optimal power allocation policies are investigated for
SKG systems with M parallel subchannels – modeled as
M block fading additive white Gaussian noise (BF-AWGN)
channels – under short-term power constraints. In the case of
uncorrelated jamming attacks, it is shown through numerical
evaluations that equally distributing their power across the
available spectrum is near-optimal for active adversaries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The system
model is described in Section II. Furthermore, in Section III
optimal signalling schemes for the pair of legitimate nodes
and the jammer are derived while optimal power allocation
schemes over M parallel subchannels under short-term power
constraints are investigated in Section IV. Numerical evalua-
tions are presented in Section V while the conclusions of this
work are drawn in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
The system model is shown in Fig.1 with Alice and Bob
denoting legitimate nodes and Eve a jammer. The SKG process
includes two distinct cycles over which the channel coefﬁcients
between Alice and Bob are assumed to be reciprocal and
stationary and then to change independently, i.e., both cycles
take place within the channel’s coherence time1. In this work
we assume that Eve attempts to obtain an estimate of the
main channel CSI over the ﬁrst cycle and transmit jamming
signals over the second. Moreover, given that a common
countermeasure for DoS attacks in wireless systems is the
1This standard assumption in SKG systems analysis does not affect the
nature of the presented results. For more realistic channel models that account
for correlation of the fading coefﬁcients see [8] and related works.
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Fig. 1. System model of the SKG process encompassing two cycles. During
the ﬁrst cycle (purple) Alice transmits probe signals and Eve attempts to
obtain an estimate of H. During the second cycle (blue) Bob transmits probe
signals and Eve jams the communication.
employment of frequency hopping [9], in the SKG system
model under investigation Alice and Bob exchange messages
over an M BF-AWGN channel with M parallel subchannels.
In this framework we use the following notation for the
fading coefﬁcients: H =
[
H(1), . . . , H(M)
]
denotes the main
channel CSI over the ﬁrst and second cycles, and, G =[
G(1), . . . , G(M)
]
the CSI in the link between Eve and Alice
over the second cycle. All fading coefﬁcients are modeled
to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) complex
zero mean Gaussian random variables, i.e., H ∼ CN (0,ΣH),
G ∼ CN (0,ΣG) with ΣH = diag
Ä
σ2H
(1)
, . . . , σ2H
(M)
ä
and ΣG = diag
Ä
σ2G
(1)
, . . . , σ2G
(M)
ä
. The case of M = 1
corresponds to single channel SKG systems.
During the ﬁrst cycle, Alice broadcast probe signals X =[
X(1), . . . , X(M)
]
with power p =
[
p(1), . . . , p(M)
]
over the
corresponding subchannels subject to (s.t.) a short term power
constrain
∑M
i=1 p
(i) ≤ MP . During this cycle Eve observes
the channel and obtains an estimate Hˆ of the main channel
CSI that satisﬁes [10], [11]
H =
√
1− α2Hˆ+ αH˜, (1)
where H˜ ∼ CN (0,ΣH) denotes the estimation error and
α ∈ [0, 1]. For α = 0 Eve has a perfect estimate of the main
channel CSI while for α = 1 Eve has no main channel CSI.
During the second cycle Bob broadcasts X and Eve injects
in the channel a jamming signal J =
[
J (1), . . . , J (M)
]
with
power γ =
[
γ(1), . . . , γ(M)
]
over the corresponding subchan-
nels s.t. a short term power constraint
∑M
i=1 γ
(i) ≤MΓ.
Based on the above, Alice’s and Bob’s observations on the
i-th subchannel, denoted by Z
(i)
1 and Z
(i)
2 , respectively, can
be expressed as
Z
(i)
1 = H
(i)
0 X
(i) +W
(i)
1 , (2)
Z
(i)
2 = H
(i)
0 X
(i) +G(i)J (i) +W
(i)
2 , (3)
with
Ä
W
(i)
1 ,W
(i)
2
ä
∼ CN (0, I2) denoting i.i.d. circularly
symmetric complex Gaussian random variables modeling the
effect of white noise on the system and In the identity matrix
of dimension n. For the establishment of the secret key Alice
needs to transmit reconciliation data to Bob at a minimum
rate h(Z2|Z1) [1], [2], [3]. On the other hand, denoting by
Ze the observation at Eve, the maximum achievable rate
for the establishment of the secret key is upper bounded by
C ≤ min (I (Z1,Z2) , I (Z1,Z2|Ze)) [1], [2], [3], [4]. Using
this model, in [7] the metric employed to evaluate the impact
of a jammer on the SKG process was deﬁned by
R =
h(Z2|Z1)
C
. (4)
In this study, for simplicity the derivation of optimal
jamming schemes and of the power allocation policies for
the jammer employs as objective function the raw rate of
reconciliation data h(Z2|Z1). However, for compatibility with
[7] the comparison of different policies through numerical
evaluations is performed using as metric R.
III. OPTIMAL PROBE AND JAMMING SIGNALS FOR SINGLE
CHANNEL SKG SYSTEMS
For simplicity in the proofs and without loss of generality
in the case of multiple parallel subchannels, in this Section
we focus on single channel SKG, i.e., we assume that M = 1
in the system model. Furthermore, for ease of notation the
subscript corresponding to the subchannel index is omitted in
the following.
In many studies, e.g., [4], [7] constant probe signals were
assumed to be exchanged between the legitimate parties during
the SKG procedure; on the other hand in [3] raised cosine
pulses where chosen as probe signals. Furthermore, in [7]
active adversaries were assumed to inject constant jamming
signals over the wireless channel, without any formal proof
of their optimality. In this Section we begin by lifting any
related ambiguities and formalize the legitimate users’ optimal
signalling that maximizes the mutual information between
their respective observations in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: In absence of active adversaries, i.e., for
J = 0, the optimal probe signal maximizing I(Z1;Z2) is a
constant signal satisfying the power constraint with equality,
i.e. X =
√
P .
Proof: For J = 0 the system model in (2), (3) corresponds
to the two-look channel [12, pp. 290] with input variable
HX and a power constraint p ≤ P . As a result, the input
distribution that maximizes I (Z1;Z2) is Gaussian [12] while
the convexity of the mutual information dictates transmitting
with maximum power. Since H ∼ CN (0, σ2H
)
, the optimal
X reduces to a scalar with X =
√
P .
Subsequently, we derive optimal jamming strategies when
imperfect main channel CSI might be available at the active
adversary. In this investigation we account for the worst case
scenario in which a jammer can be closely located to a
legitimate user or employ ray tracing techniques to obtain
an imperfect estimate of the main channel CSI. The metric
to be maximized by the jammer is the minimum rate of
reconciliation data that should be exchanged between Alice
and Bob, given by h(Z2|Z1) [1]–[3]. To this end we focus
on two limiting cases: in Subsection III-A the case α = 0
corresponding to full CSI availability at Eve and in Subsection
III-C α = 1 corresponding to the case in which Eve has no CSI
in her disposal. Although when α = 0 it is apparent that the
SKG capacity is C = 0, this limiting scenario will enable us
gain valuable intuition regarding the optimal jamming strategy
in the realistic scenario with imperfect CSI α ∈ (0, 1) in
Subsection III-B.
A. Full Main Channel CSI at Eve: Correlated Jamming
In the following, we assume that the legitimate users employ
constant signalling X =
√
P as dictated by Proposition 1.
In the case of perfect CSI availability at the jammer, it has
been shown that correlated jamming is optimal in point-to-
point as well as multi-user and multiple input multiple output
systems [13], [14]. We will demonstrate that the same is true
in the case of SKG systems when α = 0. When the jammer
has a perfect estimate of the main channel CSI H the SKG
capacity is C = 0 and it can be argued that jamming is not
necessary; however, the following analysis will serve as the
basis in deriving the jamming strategy in the realistic scenario
α > 0.
In this context, following the methodology introduced in
[7] we assume that Eve’s objective is the disruption of the
SKG process (instead of eavesdropping), by increasing the
cost of the reconciliation phase, i.e., by maximizing h(Z2|Z1).
Employing this criterion the following proposition formalizes
the jammer’s optimal jamming strategy.
Proposition 2: When full CSI is available at the jammer,
the optimal jamming signal J that maximizes the minimum
required rate of reconciliation data h(Z2|Z1) is linear to H .
Proof: The jammer wishes to maximize
h(Z2|Z1) = h(Z1, Z2|H) + h(H)− h(Z1). (5)
The maximization is achieved by maximizing the term
h (Z1, Z2|H) that is controlled by the jammer; h(H) and
h(Z1) are independent of the jammer’s actions. We show that
a linear jamming signal achieves this goal.
We have that
h (Z1, Z2|H)
= h (Z1, Z2 − λH |H)
≤ h (Z1, Z2 − λH) (6)
≤ log ((2pie)2|Λ|) , (7)
where (6) holds because conditioning reduces entropy and Λ
is the covariance matrix of (Z1, Z2 − λH). Regarding (7),
we note that for a given autocorrelation matrix the entropy
is maximized by a Gaussian distribution [12]. (6) and (7) hold
for arbitrary λ; here we choose λ = E[Z2H
∗]
σ2
H
.
Now let’s assume that the jammer employs linear jamming
so that the jamming signal can be expressed as
J =
κ
G
H +
√
v, (8)
where κ ∈ R and v ∈ R+. We assume that the following power
constraint is met: κ2/σ2Gσ
2
H + v ≤ Γ. Taking into account
Proposition 1 and substituting (8) into (2)-(3), the observations
at Alice and Bob can then be rewritten as
Z1 =
√
PH +W1, (9)
Z2 =
Ä√
P + κ
ä
H +
√
vG+W2. (10)
Next, suppose that optimal J˜ is found so that h (Z1, Z2|H)
is maximized, or, equivalently, (7) is satisﬁed with equality.
We deﬁne R such that
R = J˜ −
E
î
J˜H∗
ó
σ2H
H, (11)
so that R is uncorrelated with H . Exploiting this fact, the
power of the optimal jamming signal is found to be
E
î
|J˜ |2
ó
=
E
ï∣∣∣J˜H∗∣∣∣2ò
σ2H
+ E
[|R|2] ,
and must satisfy the power constraint so that the optimal
jamming signal is feasible.
We observe that setting
κ =
E
î
J˜GH∗
ó
σ2H
, (12)
v = E
[|R|2] , (13)
results in J having the same power as J˜ . Furthermore, the
autocorrelation matrix Λ is the same for both J and J˜ . Since
uncorrelated Gaussian signals are also independent, J˜ achieves
(6) and (7) with equality, and therefore so does J . In conclu-
sion, J has power equal to that of the optimal jamming signal
and satisﬁes the same constraints as the optimal jamming
signal; as a result, J is optimal.
Remark: If P/σ2Gσ
2
H ≤ Γ, the optimal jamming signal can
designed so that κ = −√P , i.e., Bob’s transmission during
the second cycle can be completely canceled off. On the other
hand whenever P/σ2Gσ
2
H > Γ, the optimal strategy would be
to cancel off as much as possible Bob’s transmission.
B. Imperfect Main Channel CSI at Eve: Linear Jamming
Now let us assume that Eve has imperfect main channel CSI
s.t. H =
√
1− α2Hˆ + αH˜ for some α ∈ (0, 1) and perfect
channel CSI for the link Eve-Alice. Based on the analysis in
III-A Eve can simply inject linear jamming in the form
J =
κ
G
√
1− α2Hˆ, (14)
so that Bob’s observation can be expressed as:
Z2 = (
√
P + κ)H + W˜2, (15)
with W˜2 = W2 − ακH˜ . Similarly to the case of perfect main
channel CSI, h(Z2|Z1) is maximized for κ = −
√
P if the
jammer has sufﬁcient power resources, P
√
1− α2 σ2H
σ2
G
≤ Γ.
Corollary 1: When imperfect main channel CSI Hˆ is at
Eve’s disposal, the jamming signal that maximizes the rate of
reconciliation data h(Z2|Z1) is linear to Hˆ .
C. Absence of Main Channel CSI at Eve: Uncorrelated Jam-
ming
Next, the optimal jamming is characterized in absence of
main channel CSI, i.e., α = 1 in the following proposition.
Proposition 3: For α = 1 when no main channel CSI is
available at the jammer the optimal jamming signal J is the
constant signal J =
√
Γ.
Proof: The case of absence of main channel CSI can be
treated as a subcase of the full CSI availability case examined
in III-A. Based on this observation, as shown in the proof of
Proposition 2, the optimal jamming signal can be expressed
as J = E[JGH
∗]
σ2
H
G
H +
√
v. In absence of knowledge of H ,
the term JG is necessarily uncorrelated with H so that J =
E[JG]E[H∗]
σ2
H
G
H+
√
v =
√
v. Finally, due to the convexity of the
entropy, maximization is achieved when the power constraint
is satisﬁed with equality, i.e., J =
√
v =
√
Γ.
IV. POWER ALLOCATION POLICIES OVER M PARALLEL
SUBCHANNELS
In this Section we investigate the power allocation policies,
ﬁrst for the legitimate users and then for the jammer when M
parallel subchannels are used in the SKG process. The metric
to be optimized by the legitimate users is naturally their mutual
information over the M parallel subchannels. On the other
hand, assuming that the adversary’s goal is the interruption
of the SKG process, the metric to be maximized is the rate
of the reconciliation data that need to exchanged between the
legitimate parties to establish a common secret key h(Z2|Z1).
For the pair of legitimate users it is straightforward to
demonstrate that equidistribution of the power resources is the
optimal strategy, denoted henceforth as the “blind” policy. On
the other hand, for the jammer the optimal policy depends on
α, i.e., on the accuracy of the main channel CSI estimates.
A. Optimal Power Allocation for the Legitimate Users
During the SKG process the legitimate users do not possess
any knowledge regarding the fading coefﬁcients they attempt
to estimate to establish the secret key. Alice’s and Bob’s
optimal power allocation strategies can be determined by the
following optimization problem
argmax
p
min (I (Z1,Z2) , I (Z1,Z2|Ze)) , (16)
s.t.
M∑
i=1
p(i) ≤MP, (17)
Irrespective of the type of jamming injected by Eve (correlated
or uncorrelated), the objective function is monotone increasing
in p so that in both cases the optimal power allocation policy –
denoted by p∗ – is the equidistribution of the power resources,
i.e.,
p∗ = [P ]Mi=1 . (18)
This is a general result for the maximization of monotonically
increasing cost functions in blind scenarios. For details on a
proof using dynamic programming see Appendix A.
B. Optimal Power Allocation for a Jammer Employing Cor-
related Jamming
We begin with the case in which Eve has full CSI, i.e.,
knowledge of H,G and of the power allocation policy p∗
(18). We denote the jammer’s optimal power allocation γ∗ =
[γ(1)∗, . . . , γ(M)∗] where γ(i)∗ =
(
κ(i)∗
)2 σ2
H
(i)
σ2
G
(i) + v
(i)∗. γ∗ is
evaluated as the solution of the optimization problem
argmin
γ
h(Z2|Z1) = h(Z1,Z2)− h(Z1), (19)
s.t.
M∑
i=1
γ(i) ≤MΓ. (20)
The cost function in (19) is nonnegative and the maximum is
achieved when Z2 is uncorrelated with Z1, i.e, from the point
of view of disruption of the SKG process the worse case is
when Eve has enough power to cancel off Bob’s transmission.
This is feasible only if
Γmin =
1
M
M∑
i=1
P
σ2H
(i)
σ2G
(i)
≤ Γ. (21)
If condition (21) is true, then κ(i) = κ = −√P
and h(Z2|Z1) = h(Z2) = M log(2pie) +∑M
i=1 log
Ä
1 + v(i)σ2G
(i)
ä
. The objective function can
be further maximized by using the waterﬁlling algorithm for
v = [v(1), . . . , v(M)] over the remaining powerMΓ−MΓmin:
iff
M∑
i=1
P
σ
2(i)
H
σ
2(i)
G
≤MΓ then


κ(i) = κ = −√P ,
v(i) =
Å
λ− 1
σ2
G
(i)
ã+
,
(22)
where (·)+ = max(·, 0) and λ is the waterlevel chosen
to satisfy the constraint
∑M
i=1 v
(i) ≤ MΓ − MΓmin with
equality.
If the condition (21) is not satisﬁed, a heuristic power
allocation policy that minimizes the correlation between Z2
and Z1 is obtained by
argmin
κ
M∑
i=1
√
P
Ä√
P + κ(i)
ä
σ2H
(i)
(23)
s.t.
M∑
i=1
(κ(i))2
σ2H
(i)
σ2G
(i)
≤MΓ, (24)
while setting v(i) = 0, ∀i. The solution to (23) is given by
κ(i) =
−√Pσ2G(i)
2µ
, (25)
where µ > 0 is chosen such that the power constraint (24) is
satisﬁed with equality, i.e.,
µ =
Ã
P
4MΓ
M∑
i=1
σ2H
(i)
σ2G
(i)
. (26)
C. Power Allocation for a Jammer with Imperfect CSI
Extending the previous analysis to the case of α ∈ (0, 1),
it is straightforward to see that the optimal jamming signal
would cancel off Bob’s signal if the jammer’s power budget
is sufﬁcient, i.e., if
M∑
i=1
P
√
1− α2σ
2(i)
H
σ
2(i)
G
≤MΓ (27)
then J (i) = κ
(i)
G
√
1− α2Hˆ(i) and κ(i) = κ − √P . If
condition (27) is not met, then the power allocation policy
κ(i) =
−
√
Pσ2
G
(i)
2ξ could be adopted where ξ satisﬁes the power
constraint with equality and is given by
ξ =
Ã
P
√
1− α2
4MΓ
M∑
i=1
σ2H
(i)
σ2G
(i)
. (28)
D. Optimal Power Allocation for a Jammer Employing Un-
correlated Jamming
Next, we turn our attention to the scenario of uncorrelated
jamming assuming that Eve has knowledge of G but no
information regardingH. Employing uncorrelated jamming as
dictated by Proposition 3, Eve’s optimal power allocation can
be evaluated by maximizing
h(Z1,Z2)− h(Z1) = M log(2pie) +
M∑
i=1
log
(
1 + v(i)σ2G
(i)
)
i.e., as the solution of the standard waterﬁlling optimization
problem
argmin
v
M∑
i=1
log
(
1 + v(i)σ2G
(i)
)
, (29)
s.t.
M∑
i=1
v(i) ≤MΓ, (30)
with the well know solution v(i) =
Å
χ− 1
σ2
G
(i)
ã+
where χ
satisﬁes (30) with equality.
Finally, when neither H nor G are available at Eve, the
monotonicity of the objective function suggests that the opti-
mal power allocation policy is equidistribution of the power,
i.e., ”blind” power allocation.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In the following we deﬁne the normalized rate of reconcili-
ation data to the upper bound of the SKG capacity as follows
for the various cases:
R =
h(Z2|Z1)
min (I (Z1,Z2) , I (Z1,Z2|Ze)) (31)
where
Ze = Hˆ linear jamming, (32)
Ze = 0 uncorrelated and blind jamming. (33)
The case of correlated jamming is not examined because in
this case min (I (Z1,Z2) , I (Z1,Z2|Ze)) = 0. In Fig. 2 R is
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Fig. 2. R vs Γ for P = 10,M = 100, α = 0.2.
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Fig. 3. R vs P for Γ = 10,M = 100, α = 0.2
depicted as a function of the jamming power Γ for P = 10,
M = 100, α = 0.2, averaged over 104 repetitions. As
expected, it is demonstrated that the impact of linear jamming
is severely more acute than that of uncorrelated jamming.
Interestingly, using uncorrelated jamming (i.e., employing the
waterﬁlling algorithm for the jamming power) versus blind
jamming (i.e., equidistribution of the jamming power across
all subchannels) bears negligible gains. As a result, a jammer
that cannot obtain an estimate of the main channel CSI need
not spend resources in estimating the CSI between itself and
the legitimate nodes in order to inject uncorrelated jamming.
Similar conclusions can be reached by examining the nu-
merical evaluations of R versus P in Fig. 3 for Γ = 10,
P = 100 and α = 0.2. A further point that can be made
is that when the jamming power is substantially bigger than
the power available at the legitimate nodes, the jammer can
beneﬁt from using a simple power allocation policy such as
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Fig. 4. R vs M for P = 10,Γ = 10, α = 0.2
blind jamming.
Finally, in Fig. 4 R is depicted as a function of M for
P = Γ = 10 and α = 0.2. The cost of reconciliation increases
monotonically with M , demonstrating that the impact of jam-
ming grows faster than the rate of the secret key establishment.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this study optimal signalling and jamming schemes were
derived for SKG systems. Furthermore, optimal and heuristic
power allocation policies were investigated in M BF-AWGN
channels. It was shown that when the jammer has imperfect
main channel CSI at his disposal the injection of linear
jamming can severely impact SKG systems. When no main
channel CSI is available at the jammer, it was shown that
equidistibution of the jamming power is nearly optimal.
APPENDIX A
LEGITIMATE USERS OPTIMAL POWER ALLOCATION
Proof: Following the proof in [15], the stochastic opti-
mization objective function can be written as follows:
max
p
f(p) s.t.
M∑
i=1
p(i) ≤MP, (34)
where we deﬁne f(p) ≡ min (I (Z1,Z2) , I (Z1,Z2|Ze)) .
We introduce the auxiliary variables pi, i = 1, . . . ,M to
denote the remaining power at step i of the dynamic program
(DP). Then, the problem in (34) can be written as a stochastic
DP as follows: We let Vi(pi) be the SKG capacity gained
from block i to the end of the horizon if the optimal power
allocation policy is used. Then the DP equations can be written
as:
Vi(pi) = max
0≤p(i)≤pi
f(p(i)) + Vi+1(pi − p(i)), i ≤M − 1
VM (pM ) = 0.
We perform backward DP starting the recursion at block
i = M , where the optimality equations are:
VM (pM ) = max
0≤p(M)≤pM
f(p(M)). (35)
Since f is nondecreasing, the maximization in (35) is achieved
at p(M) = pM . Thus, we have: p
(M) = pM and VM (pM ) =
f(pM ). Thus, at block i = M − 1 the optimality equations
are:
VM−1(pM−1) = max
0≤p(M−1)≤pM−1
f(p(M−1))
+ f(pM−1 − p(M−1)).
(36)
In (36) the maximum is achieved at p(M−1) = pM−12 and there-
fore VM−1(pM−1) = 2f(
pM−1
2 ). Continuing the recursion we
get
VM−n(pM−n) = (n+ 1)f
(pM−n
n+ 1
)
(37)
and the optimal decision is p(M−n) = pM−n
n+1 . This implies that
if we have no information about the channel the optimal thing
to do is to divide the power into as many equal parts as there
are periods remaining, i.e., p(i) = P, ∀i.
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